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Abstract: 
Objective: This paper addresses price elasticity of  demand (PED) in a region where most patients make payments for consulta-
tions out of  pocket. PED is a measure of  the responsiveness of  the quantity demanded of  goods or services to changes in price. 
The study was done in the context of  an outpatient psychiatric clinic in a sub –Saharan African country. 
Methods: The study was performed at the University College Hospital (UCH), Ibadan, Nigeria. Aggregate data were collect-
ed on weekly clinic attendance over a 24- month period October 2008 - September 2010 representing 12 months before, to 
12months after a 67% increase in price of  outpatient psychiatric consultation. The average weekly clinic attendance prior to the 
increase was compared to the average clinic attendance after the price increase. Arc-PED for consultation was also estimated. 
Results: Clinic attendance dropped immediately and significantly in the weeks following the price increase. There was a 34.4% 
reduction in average weekly clinic attendance. Arc-PED for psychiatric consultation was -0.85. 
Conclusion: In comparison to reported PED on health care goods and services, this study finds a relatively high PED in psy-
chiatric consultation following an increase in price of  user fees of  psychiatric consultation. 
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Background
One tool extensively used by Health Economists in the 
field of  health or Medicine to assess the impact of  price 
changes on utilization of  health services is the Price Elas-
ticity of  Demand (PED).
It is defined as the rate of  change in demand that ac-
companies a change in price. It measures the respon-
siveness of  the quantity demanded of  a good or service 
to changes in price. PED quantifies how much demand 
falls for every percentage increase in the price of  a good 
or service. There are two alternative measures of  PED. 
Point-PED which measures the elasticity of  demand at a 
particular point on a demand curve and Arc-PED which 
measures elasticity at the midpoint between the two se-
lected points1.Because at higher prices, the quantity of  
goods /services demanded will be less, PED appears as 
a negative number. Elasticity larger than - 1.0 means a 
change in price has a relatively large impact on demand. 
This is interpreted as elastic. If  the elasticity is between 
zero and -1.0, this is interpreted as a inelastic demand. 
This means that the percentage change in demand is 
smaller than the percentage change in price. For goods or 
services that are absolute necessities price changes have 
very little or no impact on the quantity demanded. For 
example the demand for emergency health services such 
as defibrillator at times of  cardiac arrest will be relatively 
inelastic. However, for luxury goods and services (for
example, luxury cars, going on a boat cruise etc.) demand 
is highly price-elastic. Accordingly, such commodities 
have high elasticity of  demand. Demand for health care 
is generally priceinelastic, with PED estimates normally 
hovering around –0.2.2,3, and between -0.1 to -0.6 for
prescription drugs2.
In low- and middle-income countries removing or reduc-
ing user fees have been found to increase the utilization 
of  curative and preventive health services. Similarly in-
troducing or increasing user fees reduce the utilization of  
some curative services, although quality improvements 
may help maintain utilization4.
Consumers, in general, adapt to changes in price not only 
by changing the quantity purchased, but also by chang-
ing the quality. There is disparity in consumer response 
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Table 1 shows the weekly mean clinic attendance over 
the 24-month period. The highest clinic attendance, 152, 
was in April 2009 while the lowest was 60 in September 
2010.The highest clinic attendance after the increase was 
in January 2010 where clinic attendance was 109.
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to health service utilization depending on whether they 
are public or private. For example, a study from Lesotho-
showed that increasing user fees led to a drop in utiliza-
tion in the public sector, while for the same increase the 
uptake of  services in private not-for-profit facilities did 
not change5
Financing health care through user fees have certain char-
acteristics: (a) Payment is made at the point of  service use 
(b) There is no risk sharing. (c) It may present a barrier 
to access (d) it may have negative effects on equity6-8. De-
spite the aforementioned issues, in Nigeria (as well as in
many sub–Saharan countries) over 60% of  health expen-
diture comes from out of  pocket payment9.
In September 2009, the cost of  user fees at the Universi-
ty College Hospital (UCH) Ibadan, Nigeria was reviewed 
upwards. The price of  consultation at theoutpatient clinic 
was increased from 750 Naira ($6) to 1, 250Naira ($8.33), 
a 67% increase. We hypothesized that the increase would 
have a negative impact on demand for consultation.
The aim of  this study was to determine the magnitude 
of  the effect of  this price increase on demand for psy-
chiatric consultation (i.e. Health service utilization) and 
estimate Arc-PED for psychiatric consultation following 
this increase.
Methods
The study was descriptive and observational. The ob-
servations resulted from a "natural experiment" and in-
volved examining utilization before and after a 67% price 
increase for consultation services. The study was per-
formed at University College Hospital (UCH), Ibadan 
Nigeria. UCH is an academic tertiary care teaching hospi-
tal and referral center. It is located in Ibadan, Southwest 
Nigeria. The hospital receives referrals from Southwest 
Nigeria and not
infrequently from other parts of  Nigeria. The estimated 
population of  South West Nigeria is about 28 million.10
The Department of  Psychiatry is one of  the major spe-
cialties in the hospital. The hospital runs two adult clinics 
on Mondays and Fridays. The records officer for each 
clinic records the clinic attendance. An inventory of  the 
weekly clinic attendance 12 months before the increase in 
price of  consultation to 12 months after the increase was 
taken. Aggregate data on clinic attendance was collected 
to capture the 24-month period (October 2008 –Septem-
ber 2010). The effect of  price increase was measured in 
terms of  changes in service utilization (clinic attendance) 
and Arc-PED. The study was conducted in compliance 
with recognized international standards, including the In-
ternational Conference on Harmonization, the Council 
for International Organizations of  Medical Sciences and 
the principles of  the Declaration
of  Helsinki. 
The weekly mean clinic attendance before the consulta-
tion fee was increased was 128.5 (S.D. =15.3) while the 
mean weekly clinic attendance after the increase was 84.3 
(S.D. =15.9). The decrease in mean clinic attendance of  
44.2 was statistically significant P<0.001 (95% CI 34.5-
53.9.) This reduction represents a 34.4% reduction in 
weekly clinic attendance. The price elasticity of  demand 
was  -0.85.
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October 2008 131 October 2009 107 
November2008 125 November 2009 95 
December 2008 141 December 2009 89 
January 2009 111 January 2010 109 
February  2009 113 February 2010 67 
March 2009 126 March 2010 93 
April 2009 152 April 2010 69 
May 2009 141 May 2010 95 
June 2009 145 June 2010 73 
July 2009 99 July 2010 78 
August 2009 128 August 2010 77 
September 2009 130 September 2010 60 




This study provides evidence that there was a significant 
decrease in demand for psychiatric consultation (weekly 
clinic attendance) from 128.5 per week to 84.3 per week 
following the price hike. The Arc-PED for psychiatric 
consultation was -0.85. The significance of  a PED for 
consultation of  -0.85 can be better appreciated when one 
considers that estimates of  price elasticity for hospital 
care ranges from -0.14 to -0.22,3,11. The figure -0.14 to -0.2 
suggests that demand for hospital care/health services 
is highly inelastic, meaning that when people need cura-
tive care or other health services, especially at times of  
life-threatening illnesses or injury, they are far less likely 
to be concerned about the price of  the service. They usu-
ally find any means possible to pay. In Nigeria, it is not 
uncommon for patients and their relatives to sell landed 
property, houses, cars and shares to offset medical bills. 
By strict definition, a PED of  -0.85 should be classified 
as inelastic, but considering that the PED for health care 
products ranges from-0.14 to -0.2, a PED of  health care 
product in the range of  -0.85 is high. What was found in 
the current study (-0.85) is 4-6 times the PED for health 
care in general.
What do the findings of  this study suggest?  It implies 
that the decision to increase consultation fees by 66.7% 
has negatively impacted the number of  hospital visits by 
34.4%.  Count of  hospital visits per month differs from 
the count of  patients visiting the hospital per month, giv-
en that a single patient may make more than one visit 
to the hospital in a month, as prescribed by the doctor. 
Consequently, since we did not obtain weekly visits per 
patient, before and after the price increase, we could not 
assess the impact of  price change on the number of  pa-
tients visiting the hospital as we have done for the impact 
on the number of  consultations. 
Nevertheless, the few of  our patients who visit the out-
patient clinic more than once a month are those that need 
more frequent assessments because of  the severity of  
their illness. This means that a substantial proportion of  
the decrease in hospital visits was in fact due to a decrease 
in the number of  patients visiting the clinic. The conse-
quence of  this is that those unwilling to pay the higher 
prices (who in many cases are patients’ relatives) proba-
bly cannot afford to do so, or have stronger, competing 
priorities for their money. Those still willing to pay the 
higher prices probably do so because they can afford to 
pay, and attach a higher value to health consultations for 
themselves or their relatives as the case may be, albeit at 
an opportunity cost.
In Nigeria, a middle income country (as classified by the 
World Bank), over 52% of  the population earns below 
the minimum wage of  18000 Naira (106USD), and over 
60% of  the population lives below the poverty line12. 
Based on the observations from this clinic, how do pa-
tients / patient relatives adjust to such increases in prices? 
First, patients may not pay for consultation, even if  they 
are willing, because the services are beyond their capacity 
to pay. As such, they remain at home with their illnesses. 
The results are relapses, morbidities and in worse cases 
mortalities, all of  which could have been prevented. Fur-
thermore, since out of  pocket payments (unlike public or 
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private health insurance schemes) do not protect patients 
from the costs of  illness, the increase has substantial neg-
ative effects and may lead to increasing poverty and suf-
fering for the patients or their relatives. This situation is 
worsened by the fact that people with low socio-econom-
ic status are more susceptible to mental disorders and 
vice versa13,14. Such mental disorders are associated with 
reduced earnings15.  Consequently, those that attempt to 
pay lose what little money or assets they have. Alterna-
tively, if  they do not pay and get treated, the mental ill-
ness worsens. What is then created is a vicious cycle of  
poverty and mental illness. Secondly, patients may adjust 
to a price increase by reducing the number of  follow up 
visits to affordable limits. For example, if  prescribed fol-
low up visits are 1 per month, with a price hike, a patient 
may reduce this to 1 in 4 months, 1 in 6 months or even 
less frequently depending on the affordability. Thirdly, 
patients may make adjustments to price change by chang-
ing the quality of  care to cheaper alternatives. In mental 
health care, this comes in the form of  complementary 
alternative mental health care providers such as herbal-
ists, spiritualists, churches etc. Unfortunately, anecdot-
al reports show that many patients cumulatively end up 
paying more with some of  the complementary alternative 
mental health care providers.
While the need to cover running costs in hospitals by 
generating more funds is important, there are other ways 
in which the financial burden of  the cost of  health care 
can be reduced. One method is by increased risk pooling. 
Risk pooling is the management of  financial resources so 
that large, unpredictable individual financial risks become 
predictable and are distributed among all members of  the 
pool. The pooling of  financial risks is the foundation of  
traditional health insurance schemes. Examples include 
the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK and the 
newly introduced National Health Scheme (NHIS) in Ni-
geria. Other avenues include community health insurance 
schemes and private health insurance schemes.
Limitations
This study was not without limitations. First, the partici-
pants were not clustered by income/socioeconomic class; 
however, low-income individuals would be more impact-
ed by the increase than high-income individuals. Price is 
a significant determinant of  health care demand in many 
poor rural areas in developing countries such as Nige-
ria and price elasticity is higher for low-income than for 
high-income groups16. Second, while the price increase 
provides some aspects of  a natural experiment, there is 
no control group, so that we cannot rule out the possi-
bility that the observed change in use is not confounded 
by other factors. However, in order to limit the effect of  
confounders, we focused on changes right around the 
price change (i.e. 12 months before and 12 months af-
ter), since the further out from the price change, the more 
likely that other confounding factors come into play.
Conclusion
In comparison to reported PED on health care products 
this paper found a relatively high PED in psychiatric con-
sultation following an increase in user fees for psychiatric 
consultation. The results of  this study also provide some 
insights that can be applied in Nigeria to design success-
ful health care financing strategies that puts patients' fi-
nancial capability into consideration. We recommend fur-
ther studies on Arc-PED for mental health services using 
data that lists weekly visit counts, weekly patient counts 
and weekly visits per patient before and after the price in-
crease. This will help policy makers and other stakehold-
ers to appreciate the different impacts of  price change 
on visits change, patient change and visit/patient change, 
which will also better substantiate patients' adjustment to 
price increase.
 
Implications for behavioral health
This study suggests that an increase in consultation fees 
was associated with considerable reduction in mental 
health service use. Given that most payments for such 
services in Nigeria are made out- of  - pocket, this was 
not unexpected. The findings suggest a need for greater 
sensitivity to these issues on the part of  hospital admin-
istrators, researchers, policymakers, treatment providers 
and the general public. Efforts should also be made to 
disseminate the findings of  this study to the above listed 
stakeholders to reduce the likelihood of  arbitrary increas-
es in prices of  health care services.
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